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Abstract
Poverty and conflicts are endemic in the Niger Delta 
even as oil companies operating in the region intensify 
their corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives 
in community development. Yet, there is hardly any 
assessment of the transnational companies’ CSR initiative 
privileging evidence from host communities. This paper 
assesses rather selectively the oil companies CSR as an 
anti-conflict strategy for development mainly from the 
viewpoint of Niger Delta residents. The author assesses 
how commitment in social investment seems to conflict 
with managing negative impact of oil production on host 
communities and their livelihoods. Using qualitative 
research methodology and perception survey it attempts 
to delimit the “blurred” boundaries of oil companies’ 
social investments that are philanthropic gestures rather 
than obligatory ones. The paper suggests that CSR is only 
coincidental to community development. It thus suggests 
a transition from the voluntary mechanism of CSR if 
obligatory framework that will separate social investment 
from operational costs could be installed.
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Environmental degradation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta is 
traceable mostly to the operations of the international 
oil companies in the region. These operations are related 
to petroleum resources exploitation to meet global 
energy needs that are leading to “a deep toxic stain” 
spreading through air, water, and land on a universal scale 
(Hallowes, 2011, p. 108). Aside the level of poverty and 
underdevelopment, environment abuse is all too pervasive 
implicating oil spills and gas flares which continue 
unabated since the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities in 1956. Environmental degradation remains the 
tinderbox of the region and a major source of grievance 
and disenchantment against the state and the multinational 
oil companies (Tonwe, Ojo, & Aghedo, 2012; World 
Bank, 1995). Yearly, there is news of major oil blow-outs 
that severely damage the environment without adequate 
remediation measures.
Multinational oil companies’ remediation work might 
be held circumspect if traces of oil spills purportedly 
cleaned up resurrect to contaminate communities’ rivers 
and farmlands. Several mitigation initiative to clean up oil 
spills remains “spade and bucket technology” by which 
locals scoop oil spills into dug out wells and set it ablaze. 
Oil companies seem to make up for such operational 
lapses by social investments through Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) initiatives. This paper analyses these 
aspects of CSR and government’s amnesty programme as 
anti-conflict and development template for the region.  
The paper is informed by the on-going resource-
conflicts in the Niger Delta and measures to curb them. 
The crisis of underdevelopment and the ecological 
devastation of the region have been noted as the root of 
conflicts in the area (Oteh & Eze, 2012; Okonta, 2006). In 
spite of some scholarly work in the area (Idemudia, 2009; 
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Ite, 2007; Zalik, 2004), little is known about oil companies 
CSR practises and how they fit into the overall sustainable 
development plan of the region. Oil companies’ officials 
and the host communities have been locked in claims and 
counter claims over the practise of their CSR initiatives. 
A focusing on this under-researched area will complement 
a much richer literature and the delimiting of its multiple 
uses. 
This empirical study conducted in 2009 and 2010 
covered a cumulative period of six months in four oil-
bearing states: Edo, Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers.  In Edo 
State, Gelegele and Ologbo communities were visited 
while Iwherekan and Gbaramatu communities were visited 
in Delta State. In Bayelsa State, Imiringi and Beniseide 
were visited while in Rivers State, Rumu-Erushi and 
Okirika communities were the focus communities. These 
oil-bearing communities were chosen for their prominence 
as recipients of oil companies’ social responsibility 
projects as well as being host-communities to important 
oil and gas infrastructures operated by transnational oil 
companies namely, Shell Petroleum and Development 
Company (SPDC), Texaco, ExxonMobil, Total, Agip and 
a few other indigenous oil firms. 
Both primary and secondary data were collected 
from primary and secondary sources. A total of 100 
questionnaires were administered in the communities, 
however, only 84 of the questionnaires were duly 
completed and returned. While multiple answers were 
provided to guide community responses, spaces were 
also provided to allow free expression. Questions focused 
mostly on the practise and relevance of CSR from the 
environment-development perspective drawing from 
community perceptions. As will be seen, these questions 
and the analyses of responses from the respondents inform 
the core finding. Interviews of 22 community members 
were conducted and covered community leaders, men, 
women and youths to underscore their perspective on 
the subject. Due to the difficult concept of CSR, careful 
selection was made of respondents that have attained a 
minimum standard in formal education, and this may 
have added to the informed positions that were canvassed. 
While the interviewees were mostly illiterate, the 
respondents to the questionnaires were fairly literate able 
to read and fill the questionnaires independently. Applying 
the snowball approach, being direct beneficiaries or a 
member of a benefiting community was the selection 
criteria adopted. Similar questions were posed to both the 
literate, semi-literate or illiterate groups which allowed for 
triangulation of the evidence gathered.
Secondary data used in the study came from published 
accounts, books, documents, and reports by the oil 
companies themselves and their CSR initiatives. The 
paper assesses the evidence to suggest that multinational 
oil companies CSR could gain greater relevance if it 
is devoid of the veiled philosophy of philanthropy to 
obligatory social investments. Since social investments 
appear misunderstood, further empirical research is 
needed on the prospects of CSR as an anti-conflict and 
pro-poor development tool in the region. 
R E T H I N K I N G  T H E  C O N C E P T  O F 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
As with most contentious terms, CSR does not have a 
generally acceptable definition. The concept is complex 
given to several meanings and emphases, depending on 
who is writing and the school of thought the writer or 
researcher belongs. In a detailed case study, an analysis 
of 37 diverse definitions of CSR was conducted to 
underscore its uncertainty and difficulty of any unbiased 
framing (Dahlsrud, 2008). Similarly, two definitions by 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
generally illustrate its diverse, changing meaning and 
emphasis. In 1998, it was defined as “the continuing 
commitment by business to behave ethically and 
contribute to economic development while improving 
the quality of life of its workforce and their families as 
well as the local community and the society at large” 
(WBCSD, 1998, p. 3). Two years later, it defined it as 
“the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable 
economic development, working with employees, their 
family, the local community, and society to improve 
their quality of life”. Although the latter appears more 
expansive, the change in interpretation excludes the 
fundamental obligation of ethical behaviour and instead 
emphasizes its affirmative duties and obligation of 
business to contribute to economic development (See also 
Idemudia, 2008; Jenkins, 2005). 
Blowfield & Frynas (2005) observed that CSR is 
generally accepted by government, civil society and 
business as “a bridge connecting arenas of business 
and development” (p. 499).  They held that CSR is an 
umbrella term for “a variety of theories and practices all 
of which recognizes that companies have a responsibility 
for their impact on society and the natural environment, 
sometimes beyond legal compliance,” hence “business 
needs to manage its relationship with the wider society 
whether for reasons of commercial viability or to add 
value to society” (p. 503).  While the paper mirrors the 
suggestion that CSR should progress from “the domain of 
responsibility to the domain of accountability via legally 
binding regulations” to hold companies accountable 
for their practices (Idemudia, 2008, p. 93), yet, it is the 
environment-development nexus that mixes with the 
social dimension to render the practice susceptible to 
instrumental use. Here, the environmental dimension 
which entails responsibility for a “cleaner environment” 
and “environmental stewardship” are erroneously integral 
components of the CSR (Dahlsrud, 2008, p. 4). This 
paper argues that multinational oil companies CSR should 
subscribe to ethical codes for environmental stewardship 
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within their operational systems and in ways that do not 
absolve them from their social responsibilities. Thus, 
this effort adopts the contribution that to manage the 
problem of conceptual complexity and the near absence 
of a consensual definition would require a focusing on 
the “distinction between business’s affirmative duties” to 
contribute to development and “its negative injunction 
duties” to avoid contributing to  underdevelopment 
or correcting development problems arising from its 
operations (Idemudia, 2008, p. 101). 
Not  withstanding i ts  complex orientat ion,  i t 
is generally believed that the modern era of CSR 
scholarship started in the second half of the Twentieth 
Century with the publication of Howard Bowen’s Social 
Responsibilities of the Businessman in 1953 (Hill and 
Cassill, 2004). According to Frynas (2005), business 
organizations engaging in social investments can gain 
“competitive advantage” over rivals with less social 
engagement in ways that reduce cost and increase their 
market share (p. 584). In conflict prone areas involving 
resource extraction such as the Niger Delta, it is directed 
at extinguishing agitation tendencies. 
To some scholars and beneficiaries CSR relevance 
is not in doubt. Oil companies generally employ social 
investments to appease host communities to garner 
cooperation. This appeasement usually leads to a reduction 
in business-community conflicts and the disruption of 
business operations, thus enabling the firms to maintain or 
increase their corporate performance in terms of output, 
revenues and profit. Further, Frynas (2005) argues that 
this profit motive in CSR is in line with stakeholder 
theory, which states that companies “will listen primarily 
to those stakeholders who pose the greatest threat to their 
operations” (p. 589). Consequently, CSR helps business 
organization to secure their “social license to operate” in 
the society (Hohnen & Potts, 2007, p. 11). However, in 
a South African case study, business itself is abysmally 
redefining responsibility and in ways that “eschews the 
notion of corporate social responsibility” and instead 
“favours concepts of corporate social investment and 
corporate citizenship” that are in no way related to the 
question of liability and justice (Fig, 2005, p. 601). 
The differing ideology driving business in the region 
plays out in two broad forms. While one relates to “a 
cooperative form in which there is a balanced concern 
for the environment and all the parties involved”, 
the other involves “an exploitative form in which the 
constant and overriding goal is to satisfy the interests of 
the dominant, usually foreign and international capital 
involved in the oil extracting activities” (Iyayi, 2000, p. 
170). What is perplexing is that CSR can be attuned to 
achieve both ends. Since the 1950s, oil exploitation in 
the Niger Delta and the accompanying CSR appear more 
driven by the latter paradigm. From this perspective, 
scholars argue that a good CSR should be one that has 
“comprehensive policies and practices in place throughout 
the business that enable it to make decisions and conduct 
operations ethically, meet legal requirements, and 
show considerations for society, communities and the 
environment” (Trialogue, 2004, as cited in Fig, 2005, p. 
601). While adopting this claim, I question the voluntary 
mechanism of CSR set out to meet business interest, and 
failing to adequately align with those of the poor that 
might have redefined its meaning and relevance in the 
Delta region.
Challenging oil companies CSR is to square up 
against the overarching ideology of profit first that is 
behind multinationals oil business. This “business case” 
is informed by an ideological framework that operates at 
the level of the market that corporations should be “free 
to act solely on the basis of profitability without regard to 
national or local consequences” (Korten, 1996, p. 131). 
Accordingly, Ashton-Jones (1998), pointed out that “profit 
maximization is the only basis upon which a company can 
run, so that any expenditure beyond what is required to 
get out the oil is resisted” (p. 130). This ideology is rooted 
in the strategic deployment of social services allowing oil 
companies assume the role of government agency and the 
assumption that they are the effective local governments 
(Iyayi, 2007). 
The adoption of this framework largely coincides 
with the oil companies’ conduct of their CSR that uses 
philanthropy as the basis of conducting community 
development. Shell, like the other oil majors, claims 
that it is a way to give back to the society (Shell, 2007). 
Consequently, its CSR finds relevance in the need to 
improve its image and portray it as good corporate 
citizen in the society. Yet, it is the plight of the poor 
local residents that can best underscore any relevance 
of multinational oil companies CSR which rather 
surprisingly, produces mix responses. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF OIL 
PRODUCTION AS CONFLICTS
The increasing resource-conflicts and petro-insurgency 
in the Niger Delta has attracted attention to its growing 
importance. The ecological devastation of the region has 
aggravated socio-economic impacts (Ite & Idemudia, 
2006). In geographic terms, the region is one of the 
largest wetlands in the world comprising of expansive 
mangrove forests, and located around the tributaries of the 
River Niger in South Eastern Nigeria. It covers an area of 
70,000 kilo-metres with an estimated population of about 
nine million. Most of the ethnic minorities in southern 
Nigeria are concentrated in the Delta region. Amongst 
these are the Ijaw (4th largest ethnic group in Nigeria and 
the largest in the Niger Delta), Edo, Ogoni, Ilaje, Ibibio, 
Itsekhiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Ikwerre, and many more (Stern, 
2005, p. 209). This region contains approximately 15 
percent of the Nigerian population. 
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Politically, the region refers to the nine oil-producing 
states of Nigeria. These oil-producing states are Abia, 
Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, 
Ondo, and Rivers. Economically, the Delta has been one 
of the most strategic and contested locations in Africa 
since the fifteenth century when Portuguese explorers 
and traders arrived in the area. In recent time, the fate of 
the region remains largely the same though the articles of 
trade have metamorphosed over the centuries from “spices 
and textiles to slaves, to palm oil, and now crude oil” (Obi, 
2005, pp. 189-190). The region contains 95 percent of 
Nigeria’s known oil reserves, and about 90 percent of all 
government receipts (Ikelegbe, 2005).
The woes of the region and how they differ from the rest 
of the country paints a picture of political and economic 
marginalisation as well as ecological devastation. Despite 
its huge wealth, the region is one of the poorest in the world 
among the least developed parts of Nigeria (Watts, 2007). 
There is an alarming unemployment rate of 36.9 percent in 
some areas which more than doubles the average national 
unemployment rate of 18.1 percent (Eregha & Irughe, 
2009). This means that the oil induced environmental 
degradation which destroys the main source of income and 
productive economic activities of farming and fishing in 
the region results in increasing unemployment. The United 
Nations Report conducted recently attested to the ecological 
devastation of the region and its severe lack of basic 
amenities such as the provision of electricity, potable water, 
and health facilities (UNEP, 2011). The study also noted 
that Ogoni indigenes the region suffers from the enormous 
negative externalities engendered by oil extraction and 
production including oil spills and gas flaring that will take 
about 30 years to remediate. The wasteland of degraded 
farmlands and polluted water sources with carcinogen 
destroy local inhabitants’ traditional livelihood sources and 
endanger lives. 
Environmental degradation associated with oil and gas 
exploitation is a major source of grievance in the region 
(Tonwe et al., 2012). This is inevitable since mining for 
energy is driven essentially by profit in “the value chain 
of production that is shadowed by a vast chain of waste 
and destruction” on man and his environment (Hallowes, 
2011, p. 108). According to the World Bank, the arrival 
of the oil industry, population boom in the area and the 
failure of government policy combine to account for the 
woes of the region (World Bank, 1995). Since the 1950s 
oil and gas production have resulted in enormous human 
and environmental costs (Watts, 2007; Ibeanu & Luckam, 
2006; Doyle, 2002). Mitigation of the ecological problems 
has largely been relegated fueling decades of community 
grievance and protests against the oil companies and the 
government. 
Oil spillage has been identified as a major source of 
environmental degradation in the region. A new report 
by the Amnesty International blamed the oil companies 
operating in the region and Shell in particular as 
responsible for widespread pollution in the Niger Delta. 
The human rights body argues that, “oil spills, waste 
dumping, and gas flaring are notorious and endemic” 
in the Niger Delta. Though Shell refutes some of these 
allegations, it however shares Amnesty International’s 
concern and admits that the people of the Niger Delta 
have not benefited from oil extraction as they should 
(Saturday Mirror, 2009, p. 2). 
Indeed, Agboola & Olurin (2003), recorded that 
between 1976 and 1996 at least 4, 835 oil spills occurred 
with an average of 230.24 per year or about two spills 
every three days (p. 7, 8). Till date the average yearly oil 
spills in the region accounts for about twice that of the BP 
Gulf of Mexico deepwater horizon oil blowout in October 
2010. Table I shows the number of spills in relation to net 
volume lost to the environment. According to the Director, 
Nigerian Oil Spillage Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA), about 66,697.2975 barrels of oil were 
lost to spillage between 2006 and 2009. In 2006 alone, 
28,036.0721 barrels were spilled. 
Furthermore, 11,878.1713 and 21,689.9805 barrels 
were spilled in 2007 and 2008 respectively, while 
5,093.0783 barrels have also been spilled between 
January and June 2009. A breakdown of the figure during 
this period by NOSDRA shows that the Nigeria Agip Oil 
Company (NAOC) was the highest spiller in Nigeria with 
33,557.13 barrels, followed by SPDC with 20,804.1825 
barrels. Mobil Producing Nigeria with 5,606.4 barrels and 
Elf with 3,629.984 barrels were ranked third and fourth 
respectively (Salau, 2009, p. 80).
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Table 1
Time Series Analysis of Oil Spills in the Niger Delta
S/No Year Noof Spill Quality Spilled(Barrels)
Quality Recovered
(Quality)
Net volume lost to the 
Environment (Barrels)
1. 1976 128 26,157.00 7,135.00 19.021.50
2. 1977 104 32,879.25 1,703.01 31,176.75
3. 1978 154 489,294.75 391,445.00 97,849.75
4. 1979 157 94,117.13 63,481.20 630,635.93
5. 1980 241 600,511.02 42,416.83 558,094.19
6. 1981 238 42,722.50 5,470.20 37,252.30
7. 1982 257 42,841.00 2,171.40 40,669.60
8. 1983 173 48,351.30 6,335.90 41,995.40
9. 1984 151 40,209.00 1,644.80 38,564.20
10. 1985 187 11,876.00 1,719.00 10,157.30
11. 1986 155 12,905.00 552.00 12,358.00
12. 1987 129 31,866.00 25,757.00 25,757.00
13. 1988 208 9,172.00 1,955.00 7,207.00
14. 1989 228 5,956.00 2,153.00 3,803.00
15. 1990 166 14,150.00 2,785.96 12,057.80
16. 1991 258 108,367.00 2,785.96 105,912.05
17. 1992 378 51,187.90 1,476.00 49,711.20
18. 1993 453 8,105.32 2,937.08 6,632.11
19. 1994 495 35,123.71 2,335.93 32,787.78
20. 1995 417 63,677.17 3,110.02 60,568.15
21. 1996 158 39,903.67 1,183.81 38,716.86
Total 4,835 1,809,373.68 570,575.10 1,860,927.87
Source: Agboola and Olurin (2003, pp.7-8); Niger Delta: Environmental Survey (1997)
after occurrence and imposing a fine of N500, 000 per day 
in the event of non-compliance and a fine of N1 million 
for failure to clean up impacted sites as a result of spillage 
(NOSDRA Act, 2009; see also Salau, 2009, p. 80). Yet, 
these regulations are hardly enforced except for few 
instances. For example, recently, NOSDRA reportedly 
fined Shell the sum of N1 million (about US$9,000) 
for the company’s failure to clean up the Peremabiri 
community that was devastated by the firm’s oil spill 
which resulted in an inferno. The fire ravaged several 
farmlands in the area. As with other oil companies practice 
of impunity such regulations are largely undermined 
despite contravening the regulatory provisions in Section 
6(3) of the Act and failure to act within a reasonable 
period (Akeregha, 2009, p. 49). 
To a large extent, through infiltration of government 
parastatals and politicians the oil industry lobby is 
powerful enough to block legislation and continue to 
shield oil companies when they run foul of the law 
(Smith, 2010). Furthermore, NESREA as the regulating 
agencies is hampered by its own mandate to the extent 
that the agency shall regulate and monitor environmental 
degradation except in the oil sector. The provision of 
such ouster clauses is deliberate and provides windows of 
escape for the oil companies and a license to operate with 
impunity. Other measures by government included the 
setting up of development agencies such as the NDDC, 
Ministry of the Niger Delta, that are yet to make any 
meaningful impact in the environment and lives of the 
people (Idemudia, 2009).
Another source of community grievance is gas 
flaring which constitutes a huge hazard to human and 
environmental resources in the oil-bearing Niger Delta 
region. Gas flaring occurs in the process of separating 
Oil spill is common and often leaves lasting impact 
on the environment some of which are irreversible. For 
example, one of the first Shell’s oil blow-outs in Ogoni 
land was in 1970 when Shell’s Well II in the Bomu 
oil field devastated the Kegbara Dere town, causing 
untold hardship to the people whose water sources were 
poisoned, their air polluted and farmlands destroyed. 
There have been similar Shell’s blow-outs in Nembe on 
March 8, 1994, Funiwa 5 Texaco offshore blowout in 
1978 that devastated Akassa coastal communities (Okonta 
& Douglas, 2001; Frynas, 2000). As at 1996 the Okpare 
community of Delta State had lost 8,500 hectares of 
farmland to Shell, ruining the livelihoods of over 2000 
people who depended on the land for farming (Omoweh, 
2005, p. 141).
Government's responses to the region’s despoliation 
driven by civil society pressure and community protests 
informed the on-going oil sector policy reform. Two 
new oil regulatory agencies the National Environmental 
Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency 
(NESREA) and National Oil Spillage Detection and Rapid 
Response (NOSDRA) were established in 2007. 
In particular, the NOSDRA agency for the detection 
of spills and rapid responses confessed it has neither the 
capability nor technological requirements to detect spills 
and respond to stopping it. That said, it has through policy 
thrusts ensured stiffer penalties against perpetrators of oil 
spillage and recently proposed a US $5 billion fine against 
Shell’s 40,000 crude oil Bonga spills in deep waters that 
occurred in December 2011, which devastated coastal 
communities in Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta and 
Ondo states.
Furthermore, NOSDRA Act also stipulates that oil spill 
must be reported to the agency not later than 24 hours 
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oil from gas and flared as associated gas. It reduces crop 
yields, damages plant and animal life, and constitutes 
a menace to social life in these communities. More 
importantly, it affects the health of the local inhabitants 
negatively. According to World Bank estimate, Nigeria 
loses as much as $2.5 billion annually as a result of gas 
flaring (Shaxson, 2007, p. 95; see also The Guardian, 
2009, p. 16). After decades of reluctance, the Nigerian 
senate is considering passing a bill prohibiting gas flaring 
in Nigeria. Deadline after deadline has been fixed since 
1984 reinforced in 2005 by a historic Federal High Court 
ruling sitting in Benin City prohibiting gas flaring as 
amounting to a violation of fundamental human rights by 
Shell in its operations. Still, gas flaring persists.  
Compensation from environmental degradation and 
damage to crops and water pollution represent another 
source of community grievance. Compensation is often 
denied, or when it is paid at all, is arbitrary and grossly 
inadequate (Omoweh, 2005, p. 57, 58). For example, 
since the promulgation of the Land Use Decree in 1978 
(it became a Land Use Act in 1979), land crisis has 
worsened in the region due to the huge land grabbing in 
oil extraction. The Act vested the paramount ownership of 
all land and held in trust by the state thereby undercutting 
individual and community rights to prime lands (Frynas, 
2000). 
Compensation is restricted to crops destroyed rather 
than on land appropriated. While the view is widely held 
that the Land Use Decree was promulgated to protect the 
oil companies, competition for scarce land and fishing is 
fierce, resulting in inter and intra-communal conflicts on 
land related squabbles (Omoweh, 2005). Other catalogues 
of political marginalization, ecological devastation and 
socio-economic impacts of oil extraction as sources of 
conflicts have been documented (Okonta & Douglas, 
2001). It is this magnitude of environmental conflict 
induced grievances and problems that the oil companies 
CSR seek to confront that is proving an uphill task.  
O I L  C O M PA N I E S  M E A S U R E S  TO 
A D D R E S S  S O C I O - E C O N O M I C 
PROBLEMS
There is some level of consensus both from the literature and 
this study that CSR is beneficial to the target communities. 
The concern however, is the quality of benefits and 
how the concept has been deployed without leveraging 
opportunities from other stakeholders (Zalik, 2004). To some 
extent government commitment to ending the ecological 
devastation in the region is seen in the laws promulgated to 
regulate the industry. Yet, the state owned Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) as both regulator and operator 
have vested interests that impinge on the exercise of political 
will to properly regulate the oil sector. 
From the perspective of the multinational oil 
companies, CSR is demand driven to address host 
communities perceived needs and poverty reduction. 
For the oil companies, the pattern of CSR operations is 
similar. It is mainly drilling oil for returns on investment 
while passing ecological and social costs to third parties 
(Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Yet, the oil companies are 
involved in one form of social amenities provision 
or the other in the Niger Delta. Though they differ in 
size and commitment, collectively, they provide social 
amenities including the construction of roads, building 
of community hospitals, and provision of water. Others 
are local capacity building for resource management, 
training for freshers in business, micro-credit schemes, 
and scholarship for tertiary education some of which are 
unrivaled by the absentee government (Total, 2011; 2009; 
Shell, 2011; 2007; Idemudia, 2009; Mobil, 2005). 
Notably, Shell combined its business goal with its 
corporate social investments and as a response to its 
impact on community livelihoods and environment. The 
company, like the other oil firms, recognizes that the 
company’s survival and business success depends on the 
development and survival of the communities (Shell, 
2004). Consequently, to improve lives in the region, it 
embarked on some projects in the construction of roads, 
hospitals, clinics and some livelihood and micro-credits 
schemes in the communities (Shell, 2007), contributing 
in 2010 US $161 million to the NDDC, expanding the 
business of 30,000 local people as well as operational 
27 micro-credit schemes that enabled 2,700 women and 
youths to set up small scale businesses (Shell, 2011). 
Similarly, in 2003, Shell contributed US$32 million and 
in 2006, it was US $53 million (Shell, 2007). 
Indeed, oil companies such as Total, ExxonMobil and 
Shell have invested millions of dollars into its community 
social projects that compete closely to government 
commitment in the region (Total, 2011; Shell, 2007).  For 
Shell however, the figure appeared insignificant, less 
than one percent of profit share compared to the declared 
profits of US $ 27.6 billion in 2006 prompting Friends of 
the Earth International to urge them to put their money 
where their mouth is and clean up their mess in the area 
(FoEI, 2007). 
Notably, some developmental drawbacks are prominent 
in the oil companies’ social service delivery. On the one 
hand, there is lack of transparency and accountability 
in the CSR process that excludes community genuine 
participation. On the other hand, accounting for the 
funding proved difficult as projects on ground often do 
not justify such funding claims (Zalik, 2004). Indeed, the 
financial operations of transnational companies operating 
in developing countries are hardly transparent as financial 
dealings are sometimes inflated to increase profit. For 
example, KPMG a renowned auditing firm which audited 
the CSR accounts of Shell in 2003 could not confirm 
the oil company’s community development activities 
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due to inconsistencies and poor record keeping (SPDC, 
2003, p. 25; see also Zalik, 2004, p. 411). Subsequent 
independent assessments commissioned by SPDC 
showed that the company’s 81 community development 
projects in 2000 rated 36 percent unsuccessful, 33 percent 
partially successful, and 31 percent successful. The lack 
of transparency and accountability explains the high rate 
of abandoned and dysfunctional projects in the region. 
While government is negligent in the failure to enforce 
environmental regulations partly due to corrupt practices, 
greater blame rests on the oil companies for deliberate 
manipulation of the weak environmental regulations to 
suit business interest. Perhaps the absence of transparency 
and accountability measures explains why the millions 
of dollars invested have not resulted in any discernible 
improvement in local residents’ quality of life. 
CSR AND THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME
Although decades of alleged political marginalisation 
of the Niger Delta region has been addressed since 
the coming to power of President Goodluck Jonathan, 
an Ijaw indigene from the Niger Delta, yet economic 
woes, ecological devastation and insecurity remained 
the status quo. The rebellion against the state by arrays 
of militant groups (symbolized by Movement for the 
emancipation of the Niger Delta) between 1999 and 
2009 achieved economic sabotage, reduced income from 
oil by 40 percent, and threatened national stability. The 
amnesty programme put in place since October 2009 
by former President Umaru Yar’Adua aimed to grant 
militants freedom from persecution, demobilisation and 
rehabilitation and thus restore peace. 
The oil companies have allocated undisclosed amount 
to the amnesty programme perhaps as part of their 
corporate social responsibility. Recently, it emerged 
that oil companies and government paid top notched 
ex-militants to keep them at bay. Indeed, pipeline 
vandalisation and oil theft is emerging as a lucrative 
poverty alleviation strategy by unemployed youths, a new 
challenge facing the country (Oteh & Eze, 2012). While 
government paid four warlords cumulative awards of 
US $35 million annually, Shell spent about US$400 on 
protecting its oil installations between 2007 and 2009, and 
2009 alone “spent US $75 million on other unexplained 
security expenditure”, and such cash payments is 
contributing to fueling crisis in the region claiming about 
1,000 lives annually (Ross, 2012, para. 9, 11). Yet, such 
funding will likely detract from the overall funds available 
to addressing the problems of community development 
in ways that the amnesty may even become a liability to 
the CSR process. Thus, the amnesty programme has been 
described as no more than an effort “to buy short-term 
cease-fires”, with too little government commitment “to 
engage core conflict issues, or adequately understand the 
region’s problems” (Newsom, 2011, p. 1).
The amnesty package seems to follow a similar trend 
of the oil companies CSR that often targeted voices 
of dissent. Some of the warlords have been heavily 
‘settled’ by monetary gains, becoming oil spill clean 
up contractors, a service that renders them a liability 
to oil companies. Yet, only a few of the rank and file 
unemployed ex-combatants have benefited from limited 
training and skills acquisition programmes both within 
and abroad while some have been aided with business 
starter packs with economic incentives. Yet, others have 
been left out including women who were part of the 
militants’ operational command. Still, the socio-economic 
problems and grievances which ignited the armed revolt, 
in the first instance, have been left largely unaddressed.
It is pertinent to question the relevance of oil 
companies CSR and the amnesty programme that are 
being administered with a common goal of poverty 
reduction, environmental health and security. The fact 
that CSR initiatives were already in place before the 
commencement of militants’ revolt only illustrates that 
the social amenities provision by oil companies failed to 
address the region’s socio-economic needs. An emphasis 
on CSR as a solution side by side the amnesty programme 
will also appear misplaced prompting the need for a 
unified integrated approach to community development. 
The absence of a formal structure of conducting CSR 
beyond impacted or restive communities is bound to 
produce marginal results. As already manifesting, though 
in pockets, rag-tag gun trotting militants are emerging 
in the creeks with renewed violence, kidnapping and 
sabotage of oil facilities (Newsom, 2011), perhaps as a 
negotiating strategy to gainful employment and position 
of privileges.    
OIL COMPANIES CSR AND COMMUNITY 
FEEDBACK
Given the incontrovertible evidence of ecological 
devastation and CSR responses there are bound to be 
disaffection. Evidence from the data obtained from the 
questionnaires and interviews conducted in the oil-bearing 
communities show CSR as no more than a PR tool for 
the oil industry. “They do not care about us. They give us 
peanuts so they can take our oil”, remarked a community 
member. Such views are rife but hardly new and shared by 
even oil companies though manipulated to serve company 
interests. The oil companies are in agreement with the 
impacted communities claiming that since their activities 
impact the environment, it is thus their responsibility to 
give back to the community in terms of compensation 
and the provision of some basic social amenities that are 
lacking (see Shell, 2002; 2011; Total, 2011).    
Evidence from community feedback on oil companies 
CSR is compelling. To begin, the educational level 
attained by respondents proved to be a factor. Aside 
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the insecurity and risks involved in researching conflict 
prone areas is the problem of illiteracy. Conscious effort 
was made to reach out rather selectively to those who 
have attained a level of primary education because of 
the difficulty of the concepts that has no correspondence 
in the local dialects. In concrete terms, 45 percent of the 
respondents surveyed for the study have received primary 
education while 31 percent indicated that they have had 
secondary school education. The remaining 24 percent 
have had tertiary education either in the university or its 
equivalent. This implies that all the respondents have had 
some formal education and thus ought to be familiar with 
CSR related questions that were posed. 
Not surprisingly, the issue of CSR was not well 
understood and the concept does not occur in the local 
dialects. This explains why most of the oil companies 
CSR initiatives are seen as community development 
activities simply labelled pejoratively as company 
“gifts”, “sympathy” or “philanthropy”. Here, some of 
the conflicting responses from the community members 
who defined CSR “compensation mechanism” by the oil 
companies “for what is destroyed during oil activities” 
came into sharp focus. Only a negligible percentage saw 
oil companies CSR as a process in which “their rights to 
development is masked or denied”.
Next, community responses to the question as to 
whether or not oil companies operating in the Niger 
Delta should be involved in the development of their host 
communities through CSR programmes did not achieve 
consensus. However, almost all the respondents (98 
percent) agreed that companies prospecting for oil and 
gas in the region should be involved in the development 
of their host communities. Majority of the respondents 
were of the view that oil companies are benefiting 
from oil proceeds more than the national government 
and the communities and therefore should “pay back 
by way of projects in the communities”. As some of 
these respondents put it, “the money the oil companies 
are spending is oil money and we Deltans own the 
oil. We support CSR if it will bring back a fraction of 
our oil money to us”. However, only 2 percent of the 
respondents are of the opinion that oil companies should 
not be involved in the social development of their host 
community. The opinion of the minority that community 
development is the responsibility of government and not 
oil companies is significant. While it may be difficult 
for oil companies to combine profit making, welfare 
and environmental integrity, however, in reality, it is the 
former opinion that carries the day.
The 98 percent of respondents who voted for oil 
companies to conduct CSR for community development 
in the region were further asked to define what obligations 
should be ascribed to the firms. Not surprisingly, 68 
percent of the respondents indicated that the firm’s 
responsibility should be a “moral obligation” while 
32 percent prefer “legal obligation”. CSR activities by 
oil companies operate with non-enforceable voluntary 
mechanisms, and are not accountable to community 
institutions. Because it bothers on gifts and philanthropy, 
most often, the projects pack up soon after commissioning 
making the quality of the projects questionable (Adetoun, 
2005, p. 53). It is clear that although the respondents want 
oil companies’ participation in community development, 
others would prefer that government carry out its primary 
responsibility, hence the moral obligation role being 
ascribed to oil companies.     
Community members’ responses as to whether or not 
the oil companies are substituting CSR for environmental 
liability was suprisingly less challenging. The respondents 
posted a consensus to affirm the statement that oil 
companies are substituting operational requirements for 
managing environmental standards with CSR projects. 
They explained that when a spill occurs, rather than 
the prompt clean up, oil companies often introduce 
development projects in the area. They affimed further 
how the oil companies are deploying material “gifts” 
to evade adherence to environmental liability in the oil 
industry. Thus, although oil companies CSR packages 
are abused, and deceptively deployed against the locals, 
yet, it is the oil companies that end up being deceived 
into believing erroneously that their CSR is genuinely 
acceptable to the communities. 
Community members’ responses as to whether oil-
bearing communities are wrongly demanding for CSR 
instead of environmental protection elicited diverse 
perspectives because of the material benefits underpinning 
the question. Similar to the claims of oil companies 
substituting CSR for environmental protection, 68 
percent of the respondents survey agreed that impacted 
community members are wrongly demanding for CSR and 
community development projects alone instead of pressing 
for environmental remediation and sustainable livelihoods 
protection. Some community members recognised their 
predicament. “We are always seeking compensation, 
compensation and compensation. But each time they spoil 
our resources we should worry more about the protection 
of our food sources”. While 2 percent were undecided, a 
significant number, 30 percent disagreed due mainly to the 
poverty level and problems of daily subsistence. 
The compensation syndrome has played out, so far, as 
a huge trap to turn attention away from the real problems 
of the ecological devastation of the region some of which 
are irreversible. A misplacement of priority on the part 
of a significant number may continue to drive this trap of 
compensation syndrome over environmental liability. 
Further, community assessment of the oil companies’ 
CSR performance was lopsided. While 76 percent of 
the respondents gave the oil companies “poor” grade, 
23 percent said it was “unsatisfactory”. Only 1 percent 
of the respondents gave the oil companies “good” grade 
of “Pass”. This again confirms the assertion that, in 
spite of the huge annual budget allocated to CSR by oil 
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companies, communities neither feel indebted to them nor 
satisfied claiming that there is really nothing on ground 
in the communities to justify such huge expenditures. On 
the other hand, the one percent score is significant for the 
oil companies which translate to a level of acceptance and 
relevance in community development. 
Rather surprisingly, community members’ responses 
on who should be held responsible for the failure of 
oil companies CSR to deliver on environmental and 
developmental problems in the Niger did not exculpate 
themselves from blame. 27 percent of respondents 
claimed that by “deliberately frustrating the process, 
some community residents have a fair share of the blame” 
This is evidenced by claims of colluding persons, local 
community leaders and “cash and carry contractors” to 
the oil companies noted as “benefit captors” appropriating 
to themselves CSR development gifts intended for the 
collective. While 44 percent put the blame on the doorstep 
of government, only 29 percent blamed the oil companies. 
On the one hand, the widespread blame on government 
re-instates the sentiment on multi-stakeholder approach 
to development. It also underscored government’s failure 
over its inability to regulate oil companies operations 
to adhere to standards. On the other hand, this may be 
justified if the failure of oil companies CSR is due to the 
failure of government to properly regulate the industry. 
Oil companies sometimes take side with the communities 
to blame government. According to an official, the oil 
industry “generates a lot of money and it is up to the 
government to use that money responsibly” (Sweet 
Crude, 2009, p. 8). Although some community members 
agreed with this position, yet they are unable to hold the 
government to account hence they look up to the oil firms. 
The next was a consideration of the role oil companies 
should play in the process of resolving resource-conflicts 
in the Niger Delta. While two percent of the respondents 
ascribed no role, 73 percent prioritized “maintenance of 
environmental standards.” In contrast, 25 percent indicated 
that “oil companies should increase their funding of CSR 
activities.” To the latter group, this is simply desirable so 
that “we do not loose out on governments poor funding, 
and then allow oil companies to short-change us”. This 
sentiment expressed from a position of weakness is 
similar to the reasons why the communities continue to 
knock on the doors of the oil companies for “gifts” rather 
than on their government.   
Finally, community members’ responses were rather 
intriguing on what usually prompt the oil companies 
in the Niger Delta to engage in CSR activities in their 
communities. Here, Oil Company’s volition scored zero 
percent. 76 percent of respondents indicated that the oil 
companies only engage in CSR activities after demand or 
pressure have degenerated into unrest, protest, or violence. 
They explained that these may take the form of face-offs, 
threats, equipment sabotage, occupation of flow stations, 
and general disorder (see also Frynas, 2005). Only 23 
percent of the respondents indicated that the CSR projects 
embarked upon by oil companies in their communities 
were proactively anti-conflict negotiations. The result 
suggests that to safeguard oil companies’ interests for the 
oil to flow unhindered, CSR acted as a pun and response 
strategy to “troublesome” stakeholders threatening profit. 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE GAP IN OIL 
COMPANIES’ CSR INITIATIVES IN THE 
NIGER DELTA 
The study underscores a major gap in the nature of the 
regulatory mechanisms and institutions in the oil sector 
which tended to favour capital investment and profits 
over the Niger Delta people and their environment. 
This negates the principles of sustainable development 
that specifies a balancing between development and 
environmental concerns. The lack of transparency and 
non-involvement of local people in the monitoring of oil 
companies activities and CSR packages is a metaphor 
for the lack of democratic system that often excludes 
local residents from participation in policy formulation, 
decision making and poverty reduction projects. 
It is perhaps a deliberate omission on the part of the 
law makers who could condescend to undo the system by 
prescribing ouster clauses on an agency meant to regulate 
the oil sector. This sort of commitment can only be 
explained by the nature of the state that is weak because 
of its rentier-state character and depending mainly on oil 
revenues generated by the multinationals. 
The spurious role of CSR voluntary mechanisms to 
address development needs of the region is incongruent to 
sustainable development. Institutional and policy reforms 
should be directed to deciding on a legal obligatory 
framework for CSR rather its statutory philanthropic 
gestures in an oil resource management in which 
community stakes of ownership and control remained 
unresolved. While, the oil industry needs an all round 
overhaul to stricter adherence to environmental standards 
this should in no way impaired CSR funding. Clearly, only 
the exploitative form of CSR rather than the sustainable 
and non-exploitative one gains prominence hence it is 
prone to resistance and violence rather than the professed 
posture of a magic wand for community development.
Furthermore, there is a “dialogue deficit” in the 
oil companies’ CSR operations and engagement with 
the communities. In most cases, host communities are 
excluded in the design, planning and implementation of 
such projects that turn out to be company interest driven. 
Non-participation means that recipient communities often 
refer to executed community projects as “Agip bridge”, or 
“Mobil engine boat”; “Shell borehole”, “Shell hospital”, 
“Shell road”, and so forth (see also ICG, 2006, p. 14). 
In relation to the amnesty programme CSR is its mirror 
reflection, displaying an absurdity in which “vocal or 
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violent behavior, not peaceful means is rewarded” (ICG, 
2006, p. 11; see also Newsom, 2011; Ikelegbe, 2005).    
Indeed, the poverty situation in the region deserves 
greater attention and a multi-stakeholder approach. 
Communities caught in the web of compensation 
syndrome only allow a narrow view toward understanding 
and mitigating environmental problems that is based 
mostly on immediate material relief. The oil companies 
seem to capitalize on the multiple uses of CSR to 
downplay its statutory responsibility to the people and 
environment.  
CONCLUSION
This paper has assessed the relevance of CSR by 
multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta 
from the lens of community residents. To guide future 
CSR practices, it suggests a timely transition from the 
lowly stage of philanthropy to the more desirable social 
responsibility guided by obligatory legal mechanisms 
(see also Idemudia, 2008; Blowfield & Frynas, 2005). It 
notes the differing community perceptions of CSR that 
is in sharp contrast to the oil companies understanding. 
The oil companies operating in the region are consciously 
applying the CSR ambivalently and to secure the social 
license to operate and pacify restive communities 
impacted by oil activities. This ambivalent practice 
strongly undermines oil companies CSR that is also 
substituting adherence to environmental standards 
with CSR initiatives. In general, re-conceptualising 
CSR focusing on social amenities provision in lieu of 
environmental responsibility that is a detraction and not 
a contribution requires urgency. In particular, the oil 
induced poverty and the oil companies’ CSR response 
to the environment-development mix makes the practice 
subject to instrumental use hence the need for ethical 
codes. 
Part of the difficulty to fully appraise oil companies’ 
social services and relevance is a partial understanding 
of CSR that has firmly reduced ecological devastation 
to a trap of compensation rather than the more robust 
claims of ecological remediation, insisting on reducing 
risks, and other externalities in the oil production process. 
The study has also shown that the CSR projects that are 
based mainly on philanthropy are mere stop-gap projects 
representative of the prevailing understanding informing 
the CSR practises in the Niger Delta. The oil companies’ 
attention is diverted and their CSR weakened if they 
maintain funding government development agencies and 
the amnesty programme that is built on the economy of 
violence. 
From the evidence, we generalise to the extent that a 
policy intervention would insist on the withdrawal of oil 
companies from the provision of social services in the 
short term since the responsibilities are in the first place 
that of government and relevant development agencies. 
In this way, the use of CSR to deliver on services that are 
also acting as smokescreens to cover a general unenviable 
track record of environmental degradation and human 
rights abuses will likely come to an end. It will also 
make clear its statutory responsibilities to people and the 
environment distinct from philanthropy gestures. 
On the long run, once social and enviornmental 
audits such as that of the 2011 UNEP report on Shell and 
Ogoniland comprehensively implemented, the issue of oil 
companies CSR could then be reinstated within a legal 
regime. Isolating ecological remediation management and 
social amenities delivery makes clearer the understanding 
of the concern for appropriate intervention. This will 
likely be in the interest of the oil companies themselves, 
impacted communities, as well as other stakeholders 
involved in the sustainable development of the region. 
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